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Abstract
Proxy re-encryption (PRE), introduced by Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss, allows a
semi-trusted proxy to convert a ciphertext originally intended for Alice into an en-
cryption of the same message intended for Bob. Proxy re-encryption has found many
practical applications, such as encrypted email forwarding, secure distributed file sys-
tems, and outsourced filtering of encrypted spam. In ACM CCS’07, Canetti and
Hohenberger presented a bidirectional PRE scheme with chosen-ciphertext security,
and left an important open problem to construct a chosen-ciphertext secure proxy re-
encryption scheme without pairings. In this paper, we propose a bidirectional PRE
scheme with chosen-ciphertext security. The proposed scheme is fairly efficient due
to two distinguished features: (i) it does not use the costly bilinear pairings; (ii) the
computational cost and the ciphertext length decrease with re-encryption.
Keywords: Proxy re-encryption, bilinear pairing, chosen-ciphertext security.
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Imagine that one day you are on vacation and is inconvenient to access your email.
You would wish to have the mail server forward your encrypted email messages to your
colleague Bob, who can then read the them using his own private key. A naive way is
to have the mail server store your private key and act as follows: when an encrypted
email message for you arrives, the mail server decrypts it using the stored private key
and re-encrypts the plaintext using Bob’s public key. However, such a solution is highly
undesirable, especially in the case that the email server is untrustworthy, since the server
learns both the plaintext and your private key.
Proxy re-encryption (PRE), introduced by Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss [4], is a novel
solution to the above scenario. In a PRE system, a proxy is given a re-encryption key
rki,j so that it can convert a ciphertext under public key pki into a ciphertext of the
same plaintext under a different public key pkj . The proxy, however, learns nothing
∗This is a full and improved version which appears in CANS 2008, M.K. Franklin, L.C.K. Hui, and
D.S. Wong (Eds.), volume 5339 of LNCS, Springer-Verlag, 2008.
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about the plaintext under either key. Now, as to the aforementioned scenario, you can
have the email server act as a proxy, and give it the re-encryption key instead of your
private key. Then the email server translates encrypted email messages intended to you
into those encrypted under Bob’s public key, without learning the content of the email
messages. Proxy re-encryptions find many other practical applications, such as distributed
file systems, outsourced filtering of encrypted spam, and access control over network
storage [1, 2, 21].
Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss [4] categorized two types of PRE schemes. If the re-
encryption key rki,j allows the proxy to convert ciphertexts under pki into ciphertexts
under pkj and vice versa, then the scheme is called bidirectional. If rki,j allows the
proxy to convert only from pki to pkj , then the scheme is called unidirectional. Blaze et
al. [4] proposed the first bidirectional PRE scheme in 1998. In 2005, Ateniese et al. [1, 2]
presented a unidirectional PRE scheme based on bilinear pairings. Both of these schemes
are only secure against chosen-plaintext attack (CPA). However, applications often require
security against chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA).
To fill this gap, Canetti and Hohenberger [8] presented an elegant construction of
CCA-secure bidirectional PRE scheme. Later, Libert and Vergnaud [18] presented a
unidirectional PRE scheme with replayable chosen-ciphertext (RCCA) security. Both of
these constructions rely on bilinear pairings. In spite of the recent advances in implemen-
tation technique, compared with standard operations such as modular exponentiation in
finite fields [6], the pairing computation is still considered as a very expensive operation.
It would be desirable for cryptosystems to be constructed without relying on pairings,
especially in computation resource limited settings. In view of this, Canetti and Hohen-
berger left an important open problem in [8], i.e., how to construct a CCA-secure proxy
re-encryption scheme without pairings.
1.2 Our Contributions
In this paper, we first circumvent several obstacles and construct a bidirectional PRE
scheme without pairings 1. Based on the modified computational Diffie-Hellman (mCDH)
problem, we prove its CCA security in the random oracle model. Compared with existing
CCA-secure bidirectional proxy re-encryption schemes, our scheme is much more efficient
due to the following facts: (i) our scheme does not use the costly bilinear pairing; (ii) the
computational cost and the ciphertext length in our scheme decrease with re-encryption.
In contrast, the existing CCA-secure bidirectional PRE schemes cannot share these de-
sirable features.
1.3 Related Works
Boneh, Goh and Matsuo [5] described a hybrid proxy re-encryption system based on
the ElGamal-type public key encryption system [11] and Boneh-Boyen’s identity-based
encryption system [3]. Recently, Libert and Vergnaud [20] proposed a traceable proxy re-
encryption system, in which a proxy that leaks its re-encryption key can be identified by
the delegator. Proxy re-encryption has also been studied in identity-based settings [9,13].
Another kind of cryptosystems related to proxy re-encryption is the proxy encryption
cryptosystem [10,15,22]. In NDSS’03, Dodis and Ivan [10] presented generic constructions
of proxy encryption schemes as well as several efficient concrete schemes. It should be
1Shao [24] claimed that he independently proposed a CCA-secure bidirectional PRE scheme without
pairings. However, his scheme is not CCA-secure as they claimed, since there exist an attack against his
scheme (please refer to Section 3.1).
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noted that, as argued in [8, 18], proxy re-encryption schemes are a (strict) subset of
proxy encryption schemes. In proxy encryption systems, a delegator allows a delegatee
to decrypt ciphertexts intended for her with the help of a proxy by providing them with
shares of her private key. This approach requires the delegatee to store an additional
secret for each delegation. In contrast, the delegatee in proxy re-encryption schemes only
needs to have its own decryption key.
Proxy re-encryption should not be confused with the universal re-encryption [14], in
which the ciphertexts are re-randomized instead of changing the underlying public key.
1.4 Outline
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the model of PRE
systems and some complexity assumptions related to our proposed schemes. In Section 3,
we propose a bidirectional PRE scheme without pairings, and give a comparison between
our scheme and other existing bidirectional PRE schemes. We also prove the CCA-
security of our bidirectional PRE scheme. In Section ??, based on our bidirectional PRE
scheme, we further propose a unidirectional PRE scheme without parings, and then prove
its security. Finally, Section 4 lists some open problems and concludes the paper.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notations
We first present some notations used in the rest of this paper. For a prime q, let Zq
denote the set {0, 1, 2, · · · , q−1}, and Z∗q denote Zq\{0}. For a finite set S, x $← S means
choosing an element x from S with a uniform distribution.
2.2 Model of Proxy Re-Encryption Systems
In this subsection, we review the definitions and security models for bidirectional and
unidirectional proxy re-encryption systems.
Formally, a bidirectional PRE scheme consists of the following six algorithms [8]:
GlobalSetup(κ): The global setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter κ. It
outputs the global parameters param.
For brevity, we assume that param is implicitly included in the input of the following
algorithms.
KeyGen(i): The key generation algorithm generates the public/private key pair (pki, ski)
for user i.
ReKeyGen(ski, skj): The re-encryption key generation algorithm takes as input two pri-
vate keys ski and skj . It outputs a re-encryption key rki,j .
Encrypt(pk,m): The encryption algorithm takes as input a public key pk and a message
m ∈M. It outputs a ciphertext CT under pk. HereM denotes the message space.
ReEncrypt(rki,j ,CTi): The re-encryption algorithm takes as input a re-encryption key
rki,j and a ciphertext CTi under public key pki. It outputs a ciphertext CTj under
public key pkj .
Decrypt(sk,CT): The decryption algorithm takes as input a private key sk and a ciper-
text CT. It outputs a message m ∈M or the error symbol ⊥.
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Roughly speaking, the correctness requires that, for any m ∈ M and any couple of
public/private key pairs (pki, ski), (pkj , skj), the following conditions hold:
Decrypt(ski,Encrypt(pki,m)) = m,
Decrypt (skj ,ReEncrypt(ReKeyGen(ski, skj),Encrypt(pki,m))) = m.
Remark 1. A proxy re-encryption scheme is said to be multi-hop, if a ciphertext can
be consecutively re-encrypted, i.e., it can be re-encrypted from pk1 to pk2 and then to
pk3 and so on. In contrast, a proxy re-encryption scheme is said to be single-hop, if a
re-encrypted ciphertext can not be further re-encrypted. In this paper, we concentrate on
single-hop proxy re-encryption schemes. Besides, for consistency and easy explanation, we
adopt a term as used in [18]: the original ciphertext is called the second-level ciphertext,
while the re-encrypted ciphertext is called the first-level ciphertext.
Next, we review the security notion for PRE systems. This security notions is de-
rived from [8, 18], with slight modifications to allow the adaptive corruptions of users.
The chosen-ciphertext security for a bidirectional PRE scheme Π can be defined via the
following game between an adversary A and a challenger C:
Setup. C takes a security parameter κ and runs algorithm GlobalSetup. It gives A the
resulting global parameters param.
Phase 1. A adaptively issues queries q1, · · · , qm where query qi is one of the following:
• Uncorrupted key generation query 〈i〉: C first runs algorithm KeyGen to obtain
a public/private key pair (pki, ski), and then sends pki to A.
• Corrupted key generation query 〈j〉: C first runs algorithm KeyGen to obtain a
public/private key pair (pkj , skj), and then gives (pkj , skj) to A.
• Re-encryption key generation query 〈pki, pkj〉: C first runs ReKeyGen(ski, skj)
to generate a re-encryption key rki,j . Then C returns rki,j to A. Here ski and
skj are private keys with respect to pki and pkj respectively. It is required
that pki and pkj were generated beforehand by algorithm KeyGen. As argued
in [8], it is required that either both pki and pkj are corrupted, or alternately
both are uncorrupted.
• Re-encryption query 〈pki, pkj ,CTi〉: C first runs algorithm ReKeyGen to gen-
erate the re-encryption key rki,j . Then it runs ReEncrypt(rki,j ,CTi) to obtain
the resulting ciphertext CTj , which is returned to A. It is required that pki
and pkj were generated beforehand by KeyGen.
• Decryption query 〈pk,CT〉: Challenger C returns the result of Decrypt(sk,CT)
to A, where sk is the private key with respect to pk. It is required that pk was
generated beforehand by KeyGen.
Challenge. Once A decides that Phase 1 is over, it outputs two equal-length plaintexts
m0,m1 ∈ M and a target public key pki∗ which is generated by the uncorrupted
key generation query 〈i∗〉. Challenger C flips a random coin δ ∈ {0, 1}, and sets the
challenge ciphertext to be CT∗ = Encrypt(pki∗ ,mδ), which is sent to A.
Phase 2. A issues additional queries qm+1, · · · , qmax where each of the queries is one of
the following:
• Uncorrupted key generation query 〈i〉: C responds as in Phase 1.
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• Corrupted key generation query 〈j〉: C responds as in Phase 1. Here it is
required that pkj 6= pki∗ . Besides, if A has obtained a derivative2 (pk′,CT′) of
(pki∗ ,CT∗), it is required that pkj 6= pk′.
• Re-encryption key generation query 〈pki, pkj〉: Challenger C responds as in
Phase 1. Here it is required that, if A has obtained the private key skj with
respect to pkj , A can not issue the re-encryption key generation query on
〈pki∗ , pkj〉 nor 〈pkj , pki∗〉.
• Re-encryption query 〈pki, pkj ,CTi〉: Challenger C responds as in Phase 1. Here
it is required that, if A has obtained the private key skj with respect to pkj ,
then (pki,CTi) can not be a derivative of (pki∗ ,CT∗).
• Decryption query 〈pk,CT〉: Challenger C responds as in Phase 1. Here it is
required that, (pk,CT) can not be a derivative of (pki∗ ,CT∗).
Guess. Finally, A outputs a guess δ′ ∈ {0, 1}.
We refer to adversary A as an IND-PRE-CCA adversary, and we define his advantage
in attacking scheme Π as
AdvIND-PRE-CCAΠ,A =
∣∣Pr[δ′ = δ]− 1
2
∣∣,
where the probability is taken over the random coins consumed by the challenger and
the adversary. Note that the chosen plaintext security for a PRE scheme can be similarly
defined as the above game except that the adversary is not allowed to issue any decryption
queries.
Definition 1 A bidirectional PRE scheme Π is said to be (t, qu, qc, qrk, qre, qd, ²)-IND-
PRE-CCA secure, if for any t-time IND-PRE-CCA adversary A who makes at most qu
uncorrupted key generation queries, at most qc corrupted key generation queries, at most
qrk re-encryption key generation queries, at most qre re-encryption queries and at most
qd decryption queries, we have AdvIND-PRE-CCAΠ,A ≤ ².
2.3 Complexity Assumptions
In this subsection, we review some related complexity assumptions which are used in the
security proofs for our schemes.
The security of our scheme is based on a variant of the CDH problem named mod-
ified computational Diffie-Hellman (mCDH) problem, which has been recently used to
construct multi-use unidirectional proxy re-signatures [19].
Definition 2 Let G be a cyclic multiplicative group with prime order q. The mCDH
problem in group G is, given a tuple (g, g
1
a , ga, gb) ∈ G4 with unknown a, b $← Z∗q, to
compute gab.
2Derivative of (pki∗ ,CT
∗) is inductively defined in [8] as below:
1. (pki∗ ,CT
∗) is a derivative of itself;
2. If (pk,CT) is a derivative of (pki∗ ,CT
∗) and (pk′,CT′) is a derivative of (pk,CT), then (pk′,CT′) is
a derivative of (pki∗ ,CT
∗).
3. IfA has issued a re-encryption query 〈pk, pk′,CT〉 and obtained the resulting re-encryption ciphertext
CT′, then (pk′,CT′) is a derivative of (pk,CT).
4. If A has issued a re-encryption key generation query 〈pk, pk′〉 or 〈pk′, pk〉 to obtain the re-encryption
key rk, and CT′ = ReEncrypt(rk,CT), then (pk′,CT′) is a derivative of (pk,CT).
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Definition 3 For a polynomial-time adversary B, we define his advantage in solving the
mCDH problem in group G as
AdvmCDHB , Pr
[
B(g, g 1a , ga, gb) = gab
]
,
where the probability is taken over the randomly choices of a, b and the random bits con-
sumed by B. We say that the (t, ²)-mCDH assumption holds in group G if no t-time
adversary B has advantage at least ² in solving the mCDH problem in group G.
3 Proposed Scheme
In this section, we first describe the main idea of our bidirectional PRE scheme, and
then propose the concrete construction. A comparison between our scheme and other
bidirectional PRE schemes is also given in this section.
3.1 Main Idea
The idea behind our construction begins with the CCA-secure “hashed” ElGamal encryp-
tion scheme [6, 11, 12] given in Figure 1. It is important to note that, in the ciphertext
component F = H2(pkr)⊕ (m‖ω), the public key pk is embedded in the hash function H2
and masked by (m‖ω). This frustrates the proxy to re-encrypt the ciphertext, and hence
this original scheme can not be directly used for our PRE scheme. To circumvent this
obstacle, we slightly modify the scheme as shown in Figure 2 (see the bolded parts). Now,
the ciphertext component F does not involve the public key, and the ciphertext compo-
nent E = pkr = gxr can be successfully re-encrypted into another ciphertext component
E′ = E
y
x = gyr(under the public key pk′ = gy) using the re-encryption key rkx,y = yx .
Setup(κ): Encrypt(pk,m): Decrypt((E,F ), sk):
x
$← Z∗q ; pk = gx; sk = x ω $← {0, 1}l1 ; r = H1(m,ω) m‖ω = F ⊕H2(Esk)
Return (pk, sk) E = gr;F = H2(pkr)⊕ (m‖ω) If E = gH1(m,ω) return m
Return CT = (E,F ) Else return ⊥
Note: H1 and H2 are hash functions such that H1 : {0, 1}l0 × {0, 1}l1 → Z∗q ,H2 : G→ {0, 1}l0+l1 .
The massage space is M = {0, 1}l0 .
Figure 1: CCA-secure “hashed” ElGamal encryption scheme
Setup(κ): Encrypt(pk,m): Decrypt((E,F ), sk):
x
$← Z∗q ; pk = gx; sk = x ω $← {0, 1}l1 ; r = H1(m,ω) m‖ω = F ⊕H2(E
1
sk )
Return (pk, sk) E = pkr;F = H2(gr)⊕ (m‖ω) If E = pkH1(m,ω) return m
Return CT = (E,F ) Else return ⊥
Figure 2: Modified CCA-secure “hashed” ElGamal encryption scheme
Indeed, the modified scheme can achieve the chosen-ciphertext security as a tradi-
tional public key encryption. However, it does not satisfy the chosen-ciphertext security
for proxy re-encryptions. To explain more clearly, let’s take the following attack as an
example:
Suppose A is given a challenged ciphertext under a target public key pki∗ = gx,
say CT∗ = (E∗, F ∗) =
(
gxr
∗
,H2(gr
∗
)⊕ (mδ‖ω∗)
)
. Then adversary A can win the IND-
PRE-CCA game as follows: He first picks z $← {0, 1}l0+l1 , and modifies the challenged
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ciphertext to get a new, although invalid, ciphertext CT′ = (E′, F ′) = (E∗, F ∗ ⊕ z) =
(gxr
∗
,H2(gr
∗
)⊕ (mδ‖ω∗)⊕ z). Next, he issues a corrupted key generation query to obtain
a public/private key pair (pk′, sk′) = (gy, y), and then issues a re-encryption query to
obtain a re-encrypt ciphertext, say CT′′ = (E′′, F ′′) = (gyr∗ ,H2(gr
∗
) ⊕ (mδ‖ω∗) ⊕ z),
under the public key pk′ = gy. Finally, using the private key sk′ = y, A can recover
(mδ‖ω∗) as (mδ‖ω∗) = F ′′ ⊕H2((E′′)
1
y ) ⊕ z, and eventually obtain the bit δ. Note that
according to the constraints described in the IND-PRE-CCA game, it is legal for A to
issue the above queries. As a consequence, he wins the IND-PRE-CCA game.
The above attack succeeds due to the fact that, the validity of second-level ciphertexts
can only be checked by the decryptor, not any other parties including the proxy. So,
to achieve the IND-PRE-CCA security for a PRE scheme, the proxy must be able to
check the validity of second-level ciphertexts. Furthermore, since a PRE scheme requires
the proxy to re-encrypt ciphertexts without seeing the plaintexts, the validity of second-
level ciphertexts must be publicly verifiable. It is worth noting that, it is non-trivial to
construct a CCA-secure PRE scheme with public verifiability and yet without pairings,
e.g., the existing CCA-secure PRE schemes achieve the public verifiability by resorting
to bilinear pairings.
In this paper, we achieve this goal by resorting to the Schnorr signature scheme [23],
which is given in Figure 3. Note that it is non-trivial to incorporate the Schnorr signature
scheme into the modified ElGamal encryption scheme to obtain a secure PRE scheme.
One may think that, it can be done by choosing a signing/verification key pair (vks, sks),
signing the ciphertext CT to obtain a signature σ, and publishing (vks,CT, σ) as the final
ciphertext. Unfortunately, this does not work, since the adversary can still harmfully maul
the above ciphertext. Namely, he can choose another signing/verification key pair to sign
the ciphertext component CT, and then obtain another valid ciphertext. The problem
lies in the loose integration between the ciphertext component CT and the signature σ.
Setup(κ): Sign(sk,m): Verify(pk, (e, s),m):
x
$← Z∗q ; pk = gx; sk = x u $← Z∗q ;D = gu Dv = gspk−e; ev = H(m,Dv)
Return (pk, sk) e = H(m,D); s = (u+ sk · e) mod q If e = ev return 1
Return σ = (e, s) Else return 0
Note: H is a hash function such that H : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q .
Figure 3: Schnorr signature scheme
We here briefly explain how to tightly integrate the Schnorr signature scheme with
the modified ElGamal encryption scheme to obtain our PRE scheme. To do so, we
first slightly modify the Schnorr signature scheme as shown in Figure 4 (see the bolded
parts). Next, given the ciphertext components (E,F ) = (pkr,H2(gr)⊕ (m‖ω)), to tightly
integrate (E,F ) with the Schnorr signature, we generate the Schnorr signature as follows:
Viewing F as the message to be signed, and (E, r) = (pkr, r) as the verification/signing
key pair (here the base pk in pkr is similarly viewed as the base g in gx), we pick u $← Z∗q
and output the signature as (D, s) = (pku, u + rH3(D,E, F )). The final ciphertext is
(D,E, F, s).
Setup(κ): Sign(sk,m): Verify(pk, (D,s),m):
x
$← Z∗q ; pk = gx; sk = x u $← Z∗q ;D = gu If gs =D · pkH(m,D) return 1
Return (pk, sk) e = H(m,D); s = (u+ sk · e) mod q Else return 0
Return σ = (D,s)
Figure 4: Modified Schnorr signature scheme
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Next, we explain how to realize our re-encryption algorithm. We first present an un-
successful solution: Suppose the proxy wants to re-encrypt a ciphertext CTi = (D,E, F, s)
under public key pki = gxi into another one under public key pkj = gxj . The proxy first
checks pksi
?= D · EH3(D,E,F ) to ensure the validity of the ciphertext, and then out-
puts CTj = (E′, F ) = (Exj/xi , F ) as the re-encrypted ciphertext (here xj/xi is the
re-encryption key). At first glance, this solution appears to be successful. Unfortu-
nately, this is not true, since there exists a simple attack3: given a challenged ciphertext
CTi = (D,E, F, s) under a target public key pki, the adversary A simply views (E,F ) as
a re-encrypted ciphertext under pki, and issues a decryption query on 〈pki, (E,F )〉. Note
that according to the IND-PRE-CCA game, it is legal for A to issue this decryption query,
since (pki, (E,F )) is not a derivative of (pki,CTi). So, the adversary will be given the
plaintext mδ, and hence breaks the challenge δ. The problem behind the above solution
is that, the re-encrypted ciphertext has the same form as some components of the original
ciphertext, and the decryption policies for them are also identical. Therefore, given an
original ciphertext under a public key, the adversary can simply take some components
from the original ciphertext and obtain a legal re-encrypted ciphertext under the same
public key, and then easily break the chosen-ciphertext security of the scheme.
To resist the above attack, a trivial solution is defining the re-encrypted ciphertext
to be CTj = (D,E, F, s, E′) instead of CTj = (E′, F ). However, such a solution is not
desirable, since it introduces big ciphertext overhead. Below, we give an efficient solution
with short re-encrypted ciphertext.
To re-encrypt a ciphertext CTi = (D,E, F, s) from public key pki = gxi to pkj = gxj ,
the proxy first checks pksi
?= D · EH3(D,E,F ) to ensure the validity of the ciphertext, and
then outputs CTj = (E′, F ′) = (E
xj
xi , F ⊕ H4(E′, g
xi
xj )) as the re-encrypted ciphertext.
The decryption algorithm for re-encrypted ciphertexts should be accordingly modified.
To decrypt the re-encrypted ciphertext CTj = (E′, F ′), the decryptor with private key
xj works as follows: compute m‖ω = F ′ ⊕ H2(E′
1
xj ) ⊕ H4(E′, (gxi)
1
xj )), and returns
m if E′ = (gxj )H1(m,ω) holds and ⊥ otherwise. Now, the re-encrypted ciphertext (i.e.,
(E′, F ′)) and the components (i.e., (E,F )) in the original ciphertext have different forms,
and the decryption policies for them are also distinct. However, there still exists an
attack mounted by the proxy: given a challenged ciphertext CTi = (D,E, F, s) under
public key pki = xi, a proxy with a re-encrypted key rki,j =
xj
xi
first computes (E,F ′) =
(E,F ⊕ H4(E, g
xj
xi )). It can be seen that the resulting (E,F ′) can be viewed as a valid
re-encrypted ciphertext from pkj to pki. Then, the proxy issues a decryption query
on 〈pki, (E,F ′)〉 and then breaks the challenge. To resist this attack, we modify the
computation of r in the encryption algorithm as r = H1(m,ω, pk), and the original
public key will be implicitly embedded in the re-encrypted ciphertext. We will present
the detailed construction of our PRE scheme in the next subsection, and give a formal
security proof for the scheme in Section 3.4.
3This attack also applies to Shao’s bidirectional PRE scheme [24]. In Shao’s scheme, the original cipher-
text is CTi = (A,B,C,D, c, s), where A = pk
r
i mod p,B = h
r mod p, C = gr · σ mod p,D = H2(σ)⊕m
and (c, s) ← SoK.Gen(A,B, pki, h, (C,D)). While the re-encrypted ciphertext is CTj = (A′, C,D), where
A′ = pkrj mod p. Note that the components (A,C,D) of CTi has the same form as the re-encrypted
ciphertext CTj , and (pki, (A,C,D)) is not a derivative of (pki,CTi). Therefore, the adversary can break
the CCA-security by issuing a decryption query on 〈pki, (A,C,D)〉.
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3.2 Construction
We now present the detailed construction of our bidirectional PRE scheme. The proposed
scheme consists of the following algorithms:
GlobalSetup(κ): Given a security parameter κ, choose two big primes p and q such that
q|p − 1 and the bit-length of q is κ. Let g be a generator of group G, which is a
subgroup of Z∗q with order q. Besides, choose four hash functions H1,H2,H3 and H4
such that H1 : {0, 1}l0 × {0, 1}l1 ×G → Z∗q ,H2 : G → {0, 1}l0+l1 ,H3 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q
and H4 : G × G → {0, 1}l0+l1 . Here l0 and l1 are security parameters, and the
message space is {0, 1}l0 . The global parameters are
param = (q,G, g,H1,H2,H3,H4, l0, l1).
KeyGen(i): To generate the public/private key pair for user i, this key generation algo-
rithm picks a random xi
$← Z∗q , and then sets pki = gxi and ski = xi.
ReKeyGen(ski, skj): On input two private keys ski = xi and skj = xj , this algorithm
outputs the bidirectional re-encryption key rki,j = xj/xi mod q.
Encrypt(pk,m): On input a public key pk and a plaintext m ∈ {0, 1}l0 , this algorithm
works as below:
1. Pick u $← Z∗q , ω $← {0, 1}l1 , and compute r = H1(m,ω, pk).
2. Compute D = pku, E = pkr, F = H2(gr) ⊕ (m‖ω), s = u + r · H3(D,E, F )
mod q.
3. Output the ciphertext CT = (D,E, F, s).
ReEncrypt(rki,j ,CTi, pkj): On input a re-encryption key rki,j =
xj
xi
, a second-level ci-
phertext CTi under public key pki, this algorithm re-encrypts this ciphertext under
public key pkj as follows:
1. Parse CTi as CTi = (D,E, F, s).
2. Check whether pksi = D · EH3(D,E,F ) holds. If not, output ⊥.
3. Otherwise, compute E′ = Erki,j = g(r·xi)·xj/xi = gr·xj , F ′ = F ⊕H4(E′, gxi/xj ),
and output the first-level ciphertext CTj = (pki, E′, F ′).
Decrypt(CT, sk): On input a private key sk = x and ciphertext CT, this algorithm works
according to two cases:
• CT is a second-level ciphertext CT = (D,E, F, s): If (gx)s = D · EH3(D,E,F )
does not hold, output ⊥, else compute m‖ω = F ⊕H2(E 1x ), and return m if
E = (gx)H1(m,ω,g
x) holds and ⊥ otherwise.
• CT is a first-level ciphertext CT = (pki, E′, F ′): Recall that we only con-
centrate on the single-hop scheme, hence pki should be different from the
original public key gx. To decrypt this ciphertext, first compute m‖ω =
F ′ ⊕ H2(E′ 1x ) ⊕ H4(E′, pk1/xi ). If E′ = (gx)H1(m,ω,pki) holds return m; oth-
erwise return ⊥.
3.3 Comparison
In this subsection, we provide a comparison of our scheme with other existing bidirec-
tional PRE schemes. To conduct a fair comparison, we choose Canetti and Hohenberger’s
PRE schemes [8], which are also bidirectional and achieve chosen-ciphertext security 4.
4Since Shao’s scheme [24] is not CCA-secure, we do not compare his scheme with ours. In fact, our
scheme beats Shao’s scheme in all aspects.
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Two PRE schemes are presented in [8], including one secure in the random oracle model
(refereed to as CH Scheme I) and another one secure in the standard model (refereed to
as CH Scheme II). Table 1 gives a comparison between our scheme and these two schemes.
The comparison results indicate that our scheme is much more efficient than the other
two schemes. For example, the encryption in CH Scheme I needs 4 exponentiations, 1
pairing and 1 one-time signature signing, while the encryption in our scheme involves
only 3 exponentiations. It’s worth pointing out that, the computational cost and the
ciphertext size in our scheme decrease with re-encryption, while those in CH Schemes I
and II remain unchanged. Note that the computational cost and the ciphertext in some
schemes such as [1, 2, 9, 18] increase with re-encryption. Although the ciphertext in our
scheme involves less group elements than that in CH Schemes I and II, we do not claim
that our ciphertext is shorter than theirs, since their schemes are implemented in the
bilinear group which enables shorter representation of a group element. However, the
pairings in bilinear group in turn add heavy computational overhead to their schemes.
Both our scheme and CH Scheme I are provably secure in the random oracle model, while
CH Scheme II is proved secure without random oracles.
Schemes CH Scheme I CH Scheme II Our Scheme
Encrypt 1tp + 4te + 1ts 1tp + 3te + 1tme + 1ts 3te
Comput. Re-Encrypt 4tp + 1te + 1tv 4tp + 2te + 1tv 4te
Cost 2nd-level CiphTxt 5tp + 1te + 1tv 5tp + 2te + 1tv 4teDecrypt
1st-level CiphTxt 5tp + 1te + 1tv 5tp + 2te + 1tv 3te
CiphTxt 2nd-level CiphTxt 1|pks|+3|Ge|+1|GT |+1|σs| 1|pks|+3|Ge|+1|GT |+1|σs| 3|G|+1|Zq|
Length 1st-level CiphTxt 1|pks|+3|Ge|+1|GT |+1|σs| 1|pks|+3|Ge|+1|GT |+1|σs| 3|G|
Without Random Oracles? × X ×
Underlying Assumptions DBDH DBDH mCDH
Note: tp, te and tme represent the computational cost of a bilinear pairing, an exponentiation and a multi-
exponentiation respectively, while ts and tv represent the computational cost of a one-time signature
signing and verification respectively. |G|, |Zq|, |Ge| and |GT | denote the bit-length of an element in
groups G, Zq, Ge and GT respectively. Here G and Zq denote the groups used in our scheme, while
Ge and GT are the bilinear groups used in CH scheme I and II, i.e., the bilinear pairing is e : Ge×
Ge → GT . Finally, |pks| and |σs| denote the bit length of the one-time signature’s public key and a
one-time signature respectively.
Table 1: Comparison between Canetti-Hohenberger Schemes and Our Scheme 5
3.4 Security Analysis
In this subsection, we prove the IND-PRE-CCA security for our scheme in the random
oracle model.
Theorem 1 Our proposed scheme is IND-PRE-CCA secure in the random oracle model,
assuming the mCDH assumption holds in group G and the Schnorr signature is existential
unforgeable against chosen message attack (EUF-CMA). Concretely, if there exists an
adversary A, who asks at most qHi random oracle quires to Hi with i ∈ {1, · · · , 4}, and
breaks the (t, qu, qc, qrk, qre, qd, ²)-IND-PRE-CCA security of our scheme, then, for any
0 < ν < ², there exists
5In Table 1, we neglect some operations such as hash function evaluation, modular multiplication and
XOR, since the computational cost of these operations is far less than that of exponentiations or pairings.
Note that, using the technique in [7,16,17], both the re-encryption and decryption in CH scheme I and II
can further save two pairings, at the cost of several exponentiation operations.
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• either an algorithm B which can solve the (t′, ²′)-mCDH problem in G with
t′ ≤ t+ (qH1 + qH2 + qH3 + qH4 + qu + qc + qrk + qre + qd)O(1)
+ (qu + qc + 4qre + 3qd + (2qd + qre)qH1)te,
²′ ≥ 1
qH2
(
2(²− ν)− qH1 + (qH1 + qH2)qd
2l0+l1
− qre + 2qd
q
)
,
where te denotes the running time of an exponentiation in G;
• or an attacher who breaks the EUF-CMA security of the Schnorr signature with
advantage ν within time t′.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that the Schnorr signature is (t′, ν)-EUF-
CMA secure for some probability 0 < ν < ². Suppose there exists a t-time adversary A
who can break the IND-PRE-CCA security of our scheme with advantage ² − ν. Then
we show how to construct an algorithm B which can solve the (t′, ²′)-mCDH problem in
group G.
Suppose B is given as input an mCDH challenge tuple (g, g 1a , ga, gb) ∈ G4 with un-
known a, b $← Z∗q . Algorithm B’s goal is to output gab. Algorithm B acts as the challenger
and plays the IND-PRE-CCA game with adversary A in the following way.
Setup. Algorithm B gives (q,G, g,H1,H2,H3,H4, l0, l1) to A. Here H1,H2,H3 and H4
are random oracles controlled by B.
Hash Oracle Queries. At any time adversary A can issue the random oracle queries
H1,H2, H3 and H4. Algorithm B maintains four hash lists H list1 ,H list2 , H list3 and H list4
which are initially empty, and responds as below:
• H1 queries: On receipt of an H1 queries on (m,ω, pk), if this query has appeared
on the H list1 in a tuple (m,ω, pk, r), return the predefined value r as the result of
the query. Otherwise, choose r $← Z∗q , add the tuple (m,ω, pk, r) to the list H list1
and respond with H1(m,ω, pk) = r.
• H2 queries: On receipt of an H2 query R ∈ G, if this query has appeared on the
H list2 in a tuple (R, β), return the predefined value β as the result of the query.
Otherwise, choose β $← {0, 1}l0+l1 , add the tuple (R, β) to the list H list2 and respond
with H2(R) = β.
• H3 queries: On receipt of an H3 query (D,E, F ), if this query has appeared on the
H list3 in a tuple (D,E, F, γ), return the predefined value γ as the result of the query.
Otherwise, choose γ $← Z∗q , add the tuple (D,E, F, γ) to the list H list3 and respond
with H3(D,E, F ) = γ.
• H4 queries: On receipt of an H4 query (E′, U), if this query has appeared on the
H list4 in a tuple (E
′, U, λ), return the predefined value λ as the result of the query.
Otherwise, choose λ $← {0, 1}l0+l1 , add the tuple (E′, U, λ) to the list H list4 and
respond with H4(E′, U) = λ.
Phase 1. In this phase, adversary A issues a series of queries as in the definition of the
IND-PRE-CCA game. B maintains a list K list which is initially empty, and answers these
queries for A as follows:
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• Uncorrupted key generation query 〈i〉. Algorithm B first picks xi $← Z∗q and defines
pki =
(
g1/a
)xi
, ci = 0. Next, it adds the tuple (pki, xi, ci) to K list and returns pki to
adversary A. Here the bit ci is used to denote whether the private key with respect
to pki is corrupted, i.e., ci = 0 indicates uncorrupted and ci = 1 means corrupted.
• Corrupted key generation query 〈j〉. Algorithm B first picks xj $← Z∗q and defines
pkj = gxj , cj = 1. Next, it adds the tuple (pkj , xj , cj) to K list and returns (pkj , xj)
to adversary A.
• Re-encryption key generation query 〈pki, pkj〉: Recall that according to the defini-
tion of IND-PRE-CCA game, it is required that pki and pkj were generated before-
hand, and either both of them are corrupted or alternately both are uncorrupted.
Algorithm B first recovers tuples (pki, xi, ci) and (pkj , xj , cj) from K list, and then
returns the re-encryption key xj/xi to A.
• Re-encryption query 〈pki, pkj ,CTi(= (D,E, F, s))〉: If pksi 6= D · EH3(D,E,F ), then
output ⊥. Otherwise, algorithm B responds to this query as follows:
1. Recover tuples (pki, xi, ci) and (pkj , xj , cj) from K list.
2. If ci = cj , compute E′ = Exj/xi , F ′ = F ⊕ H4(E′, gxi/xj ) and return (E′, F ′)
as the first-level ciphertext to A.
3. Else, search whether there exists a tuple (m,ω, pki, r) ∈ H list1 such that pkri =
E. If there exists no such tuple, return ⊥. Otherwise, first compute E′ = pkrj .
Next, if ci = 1 ∧ cj = 0, define F ′ = F ⊕ H4(E′, g
xia
xj ); else if ci = 0 ∧ cj =
1, define F ′ = F ⊕ H4(E′, g
xi
axj ). Finally, return (E′, F ′) as the first-level
ciphertext to A.
• Decryption query 〈pk,CT〉: Algorithm B first recovers tuple (pk, x, c) from list K list.
If c = 1, algorithm B runs Decrypt(CT, x) and returns the result to A. Otherwise,
algorithm B works according to the following two cases:
– CT is a second-level ciphertext CT = (D,E, F, s): If pks 6= D · EH3(D,E,F ),
return ⊥ to A. Otherwise, search lists H list1 and H list2 to see whether there
exist (m,ω, pk, r) ∈ H list1 and (R, β) ∈ H list2 such that
pkr = E, β ⊕ (m‖ω) = F and R = gr.
If yes, return m to A. Otherwise, return ⊥.
– CT is a first-level ciphertext CT = (pk′′, E′, F ′): Algorithm B acts as follows:
1. Recover tuples (pk, x, c) and (pk′′, x′′, c′′) from K list.
2. Define U according to the following three cases:
∗ If c = c′′: Define U = g x
′′
x ;
∗ If c = 0 ∧ c′′ = 1: Define U = g x
′′a
x ;
∗ If c = 1 ∧ c′′ = 0: Define U = g x
′′
ax .
3. search lists H list1 and H
list
2 to see whether there exist (m,ω, pk, r) ∈ H list1
and (R, β) ∈ H list2 such that
pkr = E′, β ⊕ (m‖ω)⊕H4(E′, U) = F ′ and R = gr.
If yes, return m to A. Otherwise, return ⊥.
Challenge. When A decides that Phase 1 is over, it outputs a target public key pki∗
and two equal-length messages m0,m1 ∈ {0, 1}l0 . Algorithm B responds as follows:
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1. Recover tuple (pki∗ , x∗, c∗) from K list. Recall that according to the constraints
described in IND-PRE-CCA game, K list should contain this tuple, and c∗ is equal
to 0 (indicating that pki∗ = g
x∗
a ).
2. Pick e∗, s∗ $← Z∗q , and compute D∗ =
(
gb
)−e∗x∗ (
g
1
a
)x∗s∗
and E∗ =
(
gb
)x∗ .
3. Pick F ∗ $← {0, 1}l0+l1 and define H3(D∗, E∗, F ∗) = e∗.
4. Pick δ $← {0, 1}, ω∗ $← {0, 1}l1 , and implicitly define H2(gab) = (mδ‖ω∗) ⊕ F ∗ and
H1(mδ, ω∗, pki∗) = ab (Note that algorithm B knows neither ab nor gab).
5. Return CT∗ = (D∗, E∗, F ∗, s∗) as the challenged ciphertext to adversary A.
Note that by the construction given above, by letting u∗ , s∗ − abe∗ and r∗ , ab,
we can see that the challenged ciphertext CT∗ has the same distribution as the real one,
since H2 acts as a random oracle, and
D∗ =
(
gb
)−e∗x∗ (
g
1
a
)x∗s∗
=
(
g
x∗
a
)s∗−abe∗
= (pki∗)
s∗−abe∗ = (pki∗)u
∗
,
E∗ =
(
gb
)x∗
=
(
g
x∗
a
)ab
= (pki∗)
ab = (pki∗)
r∗ ,
F ∗ = H2(gab)⊕ (mδ‖ω∗) = H2(gr∗)⊕ (mδ‖ω∗),
s∗ = (s∗ − abe∗) + abe∗ = u∗ + ab ·H3(D∗, E∗, F ∗) = u∗ + r∗ ·H3(D∗, E∗, F ∗).
Phase 2. Adversary A continues to issue the rest of queries as in Phase 1, with the
restrictions described in the IND-PRE-CCA game. Algorithm B responds to these queries
for A as in Phase 1.
Guess. Eventually, adversary A returns a guess δ′ ∈ {0, 1} to B. Algorithm B randomly
picks a tuple (R, β) from the list H list2 and outputs R as the solution to the given mCDH
instance.
Analysis: Now let’s analyze the simulation. The main idea of the analysis is borrowed
from [6]. We first evaluate the simulations of the random oracles. From the constructions
of H3 and H4, it is clear that the simulations of H3 and H4 are perfect. As long as
adversary A does not query (mδ, ω∗, pki∗) to H1 nor gab to H2, where δ and ω∗ are chosen
by B in the Challenge phase, the simulations of H1 and H2 are perfect. By AskH∗1 we
denote the event that (mδ, ω∗) has been queried to H1. Also, by AskH∗2 we denote the
event that gab has been queried to H2.
As argued before, the challenged ciphertext provided for A is identically distributed
as the real one from the construction. From the description of the simulation, it can be
seen that the responses to A’s re-encryption key queries are also perfect.
Next, we analyze the simulation of the re-encryption oracle. The responses to ad-
versary A’s re-encryption queries are perfect, unless A can submit valid second-level
ciphertexts without querying hash function H1(denote this event by ReEncErr). However,
since H1 acts as a random oracle and adversary A issues at most qre re-encryption queries,
we have
Pr[ReEncErr] ≤ qre
q
.
Now, we evaluate the simulation of the decryption oracle. The simulation of the de-
cryption oracle is perfect, with the exception that simulation errors may occur in rejecting
13
some valid ciphertexts. Fortunately, these errors are not significant as shown below: Sup-
pose that (pk,CT), where CT = (D,E, F, s) or CT = (E,F ), has been issued as a valid
ciphertext. Even CT is valid, there is a possibility that CT can be produced without
querying gr to H2, where r = H1(m,ω, pk). Let Valid be an event that CT is valid,
and let AskH2 and AskH1 respectively be events that gr has been queried to H2 and
(m,ω, pk) has been queried to H1 with respect to (E,F ) = (pkr,H2(gr)⊕ (m‖ω)), where
r = H1(m,ω, pk). We then have
Pr[Valid|¬AskH2] = Pr[Valid ∧ AskH1|¬AskH2] + Pr[Valid ∧ ¬AskH1|¬AskH2]
≤ Pr[AskH1|¬AskH2] + Pr[Valid|¬AskH1 ∧ ¬AskH2]
≤ qH1
2l0+l1
+
1
q
,
and similarly Pr[Valid|¬AskH1] ≤ qH22l0+l1 +
1
q
. Thus we have
Pr[Valid|(¬AskH1 ∨ ¬AskH2)] ≤ Pr[Valid|¬AskH1] + Pr[Valid|¬AskH2] ≤ qH1 + qH22l0+l1 +
2
q
.
Let DecErr be the event that Valid|(¬AskH1 ∨ ¬AskH2) happens during the entire
simulation. Then, since qd decryption oracles are issued, we have
Pr[DecErr] ≤ (qH1 + qH2)qd
2l0+l1
+
2qd
q
.
Let Good denote the event AskH∗2∨(AskH∗1|¬AskH∗2)∨ReEncErr∨DecErr. If event Good
does not happen, it is clear that adversary A can not gain any advantage in guessing
δ due to the randomness of the output of the random oracle H2. Namely, we have
Pr[δ = δ′|¬Good] = 12 . Hence, by splitting Pr[δ′ = δ], we have
Pr[δ′ = δ] = Pr[δ′ = δ|¬Good]Pr[¬Good] + Pr[δ′ = δ|Good]Pr[Good]
≤ 1
2
Pr[¬Good] + Pr[Good]
=
1
2
(1− Pr[Good]) + Pr[Good]
=
1
2
+
1
2
Pr[Good]
and
Pr[δ′ = δ] ≥ Pr[δ′ = δ|¬Good]Pr[¬Good] = 1
2
(1− Pr[Good]) = 1
2
− 1
2
Pr[Good].
Then we have ∣∣Pr[δ′ = δ]− 1
2
∣∣ ≤ 1
2
Pr[Good].
By definition of the advantage (²−ν) for the IND-PRE-CCA adversary, we then have
²− ν = ∣∣Pr[δ′ = δ]− 1
2
∣∣
≤ 1
2
Pr[Good] =
1
2
(Pr[AskH∗2 ∨ (AskH∗1|¬AskH∗2) ∨ ReEncErr ∨ DecErr])
≤ 1
2
(Pr[AskH∗2] + Pr[AskH
∗
1|¬AskH∗2] + Pr[ReEncErr] + Pr[DecErr]) .
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Since Pr[ReEncErr] ≤ qreq , Pr[DecErr] ≤
(qH1+qH2 )qd
2l0+l1
+ 2qdq and Pr[AskH
∗
1|¬AskH∗2] ≤
qH1
2l0+l1
, we obtain
Pr[AskH∗2] ≥ 2(²− ν)− Pr[AskH∗1|¬AskH∗2]− Pr[DecErr]− Pr[ReEncErr]
≥ 2(²− ν)− qH1
2l0+l1
− (qH1 + qH2)qd
2l0+l1
− 2qd
q
− qre
q
= 2(²− ν)− qH1 + (qH1 + qH2)qd
2l0+l1
− qre + 2qd
q
.
Meanwhile, if event AskH∗2 happens, algorithm B will be able to solve the mCDH
instance, and consequently, we obtain
²′ ≥ 1
qH2
(
2(²− ν)− qH1 + (qH1 + qH2)qd
2l0+l1
− qre + 2qd
q
)
.
From the description of the simulation, the running time of algorithm B can be
bounded by
t′ ≤ t+ (qH1 + qH2 + qH3 + qH4 + qu + qc + qrk + qre + qd)O(1)
+ (qu + qc + 4qre + 3qd + (2qd + qre)qH1)te.
This completes the proof of Theorem 1. unionsqu
4 Conclusions
We presented a new bidirectional proxy re-encryption scheme, and proved its security
in the random oracle model. Our proposed scheme is fairly efficient, since it does not
rely on the costly bilinear pairings, and its computational cost and ciphertext length
decrease with re-encryption. A limitation of our scheme is that its security is proved
in the random oracle model. It would be interesting to construct CCA-secure proxy re-
encryption without parings in the standard model. Another open question is to propose
CCA-secure proxy re-encryption scheme with multi-hop and without pairings.
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